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RECENT DECISIONS
tions increase the temptations to corporate fraud.19 Though the de-
rivative suit has been abused, the abuses are insignificant as compared
with the results which might follow if corporate directors attain the
unbridled immunity this decision seems to portend.
X
CORPoRATIoNs - SALE OF CORPORATE AssErs - DISSENTING
SHAREHOLDER NOT LIMITED TO RIGHT OF APPRAISAL.-A repre-
sentative action by a dissenting minority stockholder was brought to
enjoin a plan of reorganization' under Section 20 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law, whereby his shares of stock would be con-
verted into voting trust certificates of a newly formed corporation.
Defendants contended that the plaintiff's sole remedy was the right
of appraisal under Section 21 of the New York Stock Corporation
Law. On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, the Court
granted the plaintiff's motion and held that the proposed plan was
violative of Section 20, and that the plaintiff was not limited to his
right of appraisal, but may invoke equity's aid where the proposed
plan is oppressive, ultra vires and illegal. Eisenberg v. Central Zone
Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 115 N.E.2d 652 (1953).
At common law, before a sale of corporate assets could be ef-
fectuated, unanimous consent of all the stockholders was required.2
The reason advanced for this rule was to protect the minority stock-
holder from unjust and oppressive treatment by the majority. The
rapid growth of corporations, with their increasingly large number of
stockholders, however, made it virtually impossible for a corporation
to obtain the required unanimous consent; thus, further growth was
stifled. It was not surprising that abuses arose. Minority stock-
holders, by means of "strike suits," compelled the corporation to buy
their stock at exorbitant prices
19 Ballantine, supra note 18, at 416.
I The proposed plan: defendant corporation was to sell all its assets (real
estate) to a newly formed Delaware corporation which was to pay for it with
its own stock. A voting trust agreement would be effectuated, and, upon dis-
solution of the defendant corporation, each stockholder was to receive a voting
trust certificate representing his shares. In addition to normal voting rights,
the trustees would have the right to sell all the stock of the Delaware corpo-
ration, with the added provision that they might deduct from the selling price
sufficient funds to form a third corporation which was to lease the property
from the buyer.2 See Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 66, 115
N.E.2d 652, 655 (1953); Matter of Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 493, 178 N.E. 766,
768 (1931); see PRAsHxER, CASES AND MAaiEALS ON CORPORATIONS 870 (2d
ed. 1949).
3 See Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 181, 93 N.E. 522, 523 (1910).
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In 1893, the legislature, recognizing these evils, enacted a statute 4
which authorized a corporation to sell its assets to a domestic cor-
poration upon the affirmance of the holders of two-thirds of the shares,
and at the same time reserved the right of the dissenting minority to
have their stock appraised and purchased by such corporation. The
statute has been successively amended to meet changing conditions,
and, is at present embodied in Sections 20 and 21 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law.5 Closely akin to the growth of these statutes
have been those providing for merger 0 and consolidation.7
Similar statutes have also been enacted in other jurisdictions.8
Some states, however, in what appears to be the minority view, ex-
pressly limit a dissenting shareholder to his right of appraisal and
sale.9 Other jurisdictions, in cases of fraud or oppression, permit the
invocation of equity's aid in addition to extending the statutory right
of appraisal.10
Heretofore, the New York Court of Appeals had not passed di-
rectly on this issue. In an early Appellate Division decision, where
a minority stockholder sought to hold the directors liable for the neg-
ligent or fraudulent sale of the corporate assets, plaintiff was not lim-
ited to his right of appraisal.11 Recently, however, the Court of
Appeals, in dealing with corporate consolidation 1 2 and merger,'8
stated that the minority holder was limited to such right of appraisal.
As there can be found no sound explanation why the foregoing rule
should not apply with equal force to the sale of corporate assets, it
would appear that New York had adopted the minority rule, notwith-
standing the contrary Appellate Division decision. Thus it was not
unusual to discover a lower court ruling that, in a sale of corporate
assets situation, the dissenting shareholder's sole remedy was ap-
4 Laws of N.Y. 1893, c. 638.
5 Section 20 no longer contains the restriction limiting the sale of assets,
with the exception of franchises, to a domestic corporation engaged in a busi-
ness similar to that of the seller.
6 N.Y. STocic Coiu. LAW § 85.
7Id. §86.
s For a complete listing of the appraisal statutes of all the states, see Note,
38 VA. L. Rxv. 915 (1952).
9 Michigan's statute expressly provides, in the sale of corporate assets, that
the dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy is appraisal. MicH. ComP. LAWS§ 450.44(2) (1948). California and Pennsylvania have similar statutes, but
refer only to merger and consolidation cases. CAr_ Coaz. CODE § 4123 (Deering,
1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-908 (Purdon, Supp. 1953).
10 See, e.g., MacArthur v. Port of Havana Docks Co., 247 Fed. 984 (S.D.
Me. 1917); Opelka v. Quincy Mem. Bridge Co., 335 Ill. App. 402, 82 N.E.2d
184 (1948) ; cf. Klopot v. Northrup, 131 Conn. 14, 37 A.2d 700, 705 (1944).
" Bown v. Ramsdell, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N.Y. Supp. 573 (4th Dep't
1929).
12 See Anderson v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 350,
67 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1946).
13 See Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 19, 87 N.E2d 561, 564(1949).
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praisal.14 The trial court, in the instant case, recognizing these prece-
ents, intimated that the plaintiff was limited to the statutory remedy.1 5
The principal case, in ruling that equity may intervene in a
proper instance,' 6 indicates that New York has now adopted the ma-
jority rule. In this, the court has made a wise decision. Since,
however, merger and consolidation plans may be just as oppressive
to dissenting minority shareholders, this equitable relief should not
be limited to sale of corporate assets situations.
In the majority of cases, of course, the dissenting stockholder
will have a just remedy in appraisal, and the courts should so limit
him. Further, as it is the policy of this state to guard against "strike
suits," 17 equity should intervene only in the clearest of situations.
It may be said, therefore, that this middle of the road policy, when
properly applied, seems to be to the best interests of both the ma-
jority and minority stockholders.
CRIMINAL PRocEDURE - AvAILABILiTY OF Co, AM NOBIS IN
FEDERAL PRACTICE.-In 1939, respondent pleaded guilty in a federal
district court to mail theft and was sentenced to a four-year term
which he duly served. In 1950, he was convicted of a state charge
and sentenced as a second offender because of the prior federal con-
viction.' Respondent, while in state prison, filed application for writ
of error coram nobis in the district court to vacate its judgment,
claiming he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment.2 The application was denied but the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.3 The Supreme Court,
14 Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
15 See Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 203 Misc. 59, 64, 116
N.Y.S.2d 154, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1952). The court then stated that the proposed
plan was more than a sale of assets and enjoined the creation of the voting
trust. Ibid.
26 "Stockholders may not be forced out of corporations by any such method
at the hands of directors or officers or 'principal stockholders' . ... The Legis-
lature never sanctioned such treatment of a minority stockholder and, on ap-
plication, equity will forbid it." Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp.,
306 N.Y. 58, 66-67, 115 N.E.2d 652, 655-656 (1953).
17 This position is evidenced by the enactment of Section 61-b of the New
York General Corporation Law. See Lapchak v. Baker, 298 N.Y. 89, 80
N.E.2d 751 (1948).
' N.Y. PFxAr LAW § 1941.2 There may, however, be a waiver of this constitutional right. See
Chandler v. United States, 195 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952) ; De Jordan v. United
States, 187 F.2d 262 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 942 (1951).
3 United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1953).
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